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Introduction
It is for two reasons that the donors of foreign aid are requested to concentrate efforts on a limited set of recipient countries. First, influential contributions to the aid effectiveness literature suggest that aid is more likely to promote economic and social development when donors focus on particularly needy and deserving recipients. According to World Bank studies, aid works better in poor countries with good policy and institutional environments (World Bank 1998; Burnside and Dollar 2000) .
1 Second, a stronger concentration of aid could reduce transaction costs and the administrative burden of recipient countries by helping overcome the proliferation of marginal (or non-significant) aid relations and the duplication of donor activity. As noted by Williamson (2011: 1935) , it is widely agreed that the effectiveness of aid is undermined by "too many donors in too many countries, stretched across too many sectors or projects."
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It is open to debate, however, whether donors have adjusted their allocative behavior accordingly. Optimists argue that earlier research has led "many policymakers to conclude that targeting aid to countries with more enabling environments maximizes overall aid effectiveness" (Claessens et al. 2009: 186) . Indeed, the aid allocation study of Claessens et al. (2009) indicates that bilateral aid responded more strongly to the recipient countries' income status and the quality of policy and governance after the end of the Cold War, especially in the late 1990s. Likewise, Levin (2006: 2044) observe "a clear tendency toward selectivity in terms of economic governance", though mainly for multilateral aid agencies, in 2000-2003. Against this backdrop, the first aim of our contribution is to provide an update of earlier assessments by making use of aid flows up to 2015. Most of the above mentioned studies do not cover the recent past, i.e., the time after the Paris Declaration. In the Paris Declaration, donors promised to render aid more effective by "eliminating duplication of efforts and rationalizing donor activities to make them as cost-effective as possible" (OECD 2005 The second aim of our contribution is to make use of the attractive features of Theil indices in order to provide an improved measurement of aid concentration. We construct decomposed Theil indices and track the changes in these indices during the period 1995-2015. The additive decomposability of the Theil index allows for deeper insights into the changes of the concentration of aid flows to the overall sample as well as relevant subgroups of aid recipient countries. For any 7 Political leaders agreed to double aid to Africa at the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 2005. 8 See https://www.mcc.gov/about: "MCC forms partnerships with some of the world's poorest countries, but only those committed to good governance, economic freedom, and investments in their citizens." According to Dreher et al. (2012) , the MCC had positive signaling effects on other aid agencies, within and outside the United States.
(mutually exclusive and exhaustive) set of subgroups of recipient countries, the total inequality across countries can be meaningfully decomposed into the inequality within these subgroups and the inequality between these subgroups. Moreover, it is of particular interest for us to identify the extensive margin of concentration since a declining number of aid relations (i.e., aid > 0) would point to stronger donor specialization and more focussed aid allocation. After portraying overall trends of aid concentration, we distinguish recipient countries falling into different income classes. In subsequent steps, we further refine the analysis by splitting all aid recipient countries falling into a specific income class into distinct subgroups in terms of governance and trade relations with donors.
This stepwise procedure offers insights as to whether aid has been increasingly targeted at needy and, at the same time, deserving recipient countries -and on the role of the export interests of donors for their aid allocation.
Method and data

Theil index: definition and decomposition
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We measure the concentration of foreign aid across recipient countries -or, equivalently, the inequality of recipient countries in terms of aid inflows -by means of the (absolute) Theil index. The
Theil index is defined as:
where I is the number of observations, in our case the number of potential recipient countries of foreign aid, I is the set of all potential recipient countries i = 1, …, I ; and
is the share of country i (i∈I) in aid flows to all countries (with X i the aid flow to country i).
The Theil index is equal to zero (no concentration) if each country receives the same amount of aid, or equivalently, if each country's share in total aid flows x i is equal to 1/I . ; it takes its maximal value ) ln( T max I = I if all aid flows are concentrated on just one country.
The Theil index figures most prominently among the so-called general entropy (GE) class of inequality measures. All GE measures satisfy a number of normative criteria, among which the additive decomposability of the measure is particularly important for our empirical analysis. Additive decomposability implies that, for any mutually exclusive (disjoint) and exhaustive set of subgroups of recipient countries, the total inequality across countries can be meaningfully decomposed into the inequality within these subgroups (within-group component) and the inequality between these subgroups (between-group component). 10 More specifically, the within-group component corresponds to a weighted sum of the levels of inequality between the countries within each group; 11 and the between-group component corresponds to the level of inequality between the different group averages. The decomposition property of the Theil index thus allows us to trace changes over time in the overall concentration of aid flows across countries to changes in the corresponding concentration within and between different subgroups of countries.
While the decomposition rule for the Theil index applies to an arbitrary number of subgroups, we will apply it only to the case of just two subgroups at a time.
12 For the case of two subgroups the decomposition of the Theil index can be formally described as follows:
10 Other frequently used inequality measures, such as the Gini index or the coefficient of variation (CV) do not have this property. 11 In the case of the Theil index, the sum of these weights is always equal to one so that the within-group component is actually a weighted average of the group-specific inequality measures. 12 We will do so for different definitions of subgroups, however. And we will also do so repeatedly; i.e., the two subgroups of a first partition will themselves be further partitioned, in which case the set I is partitioned into four disjoint subsets.
Let S = A, B be two disjoint and exhaustive subsets of the set of all potential recipient countries 
where TW AB is the within-group component, given by: 
As ω A +ω B = 1, the within-group component, TW AB , is a weighted average of the Theil indices of the different subgroups with weights equal to the respective subgroups' shares in total aid flows
is thus group A's contribution to the within-group component). The between-group component, TB AB , is a Theil index itself, which results from assigning each country of a specific subgroup of countries the average aid inflows of the countries of that subgroup. It thus measures the inequality between the two subgroups in terms of their countries' average aid inflows.
A special case of the decomposition, that is of particular interest to our analysis, is obtained by dividing the total set of countries I into the subset of countries Z={i | X i = 0} that attracted zero aid inflows in a given period (year) and the subset N={i | X i > 0} of countries with non-zero (strictly positive) aid inflows in that period. In this specific case the decomposition of the Theil index of concentration (equations (2)-(4)) simplifies to:
where the within-group component is now simply the concentration within subgroup N of countries with non-zero inflows
and the between-group component is simply the logarithm of the inverse of the share of countries that received non-zero inflows
In this case, the within-group component of the overall Theil index (is a Theil index itself and) represents the "intensive margin" of concentration across country group I and the between-group component represents the "extensive margin" of concentration.
14 The latter reflects the impact of the changing number of countries that receive zero aid (i.e., countries in subset Z) on the development of overall concentration (note that I N = I-I Z ).
Data
Aid data are taken from the OECD-DAC's Creditor Reporting System (http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1). We use aid commitments which are usually 13 In deriving equations (6) and (7) we make use of the fact that for subset N the weight ω N from equation (3) is equal to 1.
As ln(x) is not defined for x = 0 we substitute xln(x) by lim x→0 xln(x) = 0. For a similar decomposition in the context of trade diversification see Cadot et al. (2013) . 14 A declining number of countries with zero aid inflows is thus referred to as a lower extensive margin of concentration.
employed in aid allocation studies (Neumayer 2003 
Results
Overall concentration of aid
Considering all (bilateral and multilateral) donors, the overall Theil index declined from an average of After the Paris Declaration, the overall Theil index declined for five of the nine DAC donors in our sample (Japan, the UK, the USA, Denmark and Sweden). The decline was most pronounced for the 19 The extensive margin of bilateral DAC aid resembled the extensive margin of aid from both bilateral and multilateral sources. 
Increasing poverty focus of aid?
In order to assess the poverty focus of aid, we consider two (almost) equally sized subgroups of recipient countries with relatively low and relatively high per-capita income. 21 We focus on two distinct criteria to evaluate the poverty focus of donor groups and individual DAC donors: (i) However, the between component declined in the second sub-period -casting doubt on the responsiveness of multilateral donors to recent donor commitments. 21 For details on how we classify recipient countries see the data section above. For a list of countries belonging to the two subgroups see Appendix Table A1 . 22 The overall Theil indices shown at the top of Table 2 are the same as in Table 1 Turning to the extensive margin of aid concentration within the two income groups of recipient countries, it again appears that multilateral donors outperformed bilateral donors prior to the Paris Declaration, notably by granting aid more selectively within the group of higher income recipients.
However, the difference in selectivity between the two donor groups largely disappeared thereafter.
As already observed with regard to the between component, the Paris Declaration hardly affected the allocation behavior of multilateral donors. Moreover, changes toward greater selectivity in granting aid to higher income recipients are limited to only three DAC donors (France, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Norway). 24 Strikingly, the large donors for whom the between component pointed to a stronger poverty orientation (Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) became less selective 23 In 1995-2004 the United States actually allocated a smaller share of aid to the relatively lower income recipients than to the higher income recipients (42% versus 58%). In this case, the between component thus signals a concentration of aid on higher income recipients. 24 It is interesting to note that the Netherlands became more selective in granting aid to lower income recipients, too.
in granting aid to higher income recipients. 25 Overall, it thus appears that major DAC donors reacted inconsistently to the Paris Declaration.
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Stronger selectivity related to governance?
In the first step of assessing whether foreign aid is increasingly concentrated on meritorious recipients, we classify all sample countries into two about equally sized subgroups with relatively good governance (70 countries) or relatively bad governance (71 countries).
27 As in the case of the income classification of recipient countries, the between component of the Theil index typically plays a minor role for the level of overall aid concentration in Table 3 . Among the selected DAC donors, only the United Kingdom and Denmark granted higher aid shares to relatively well governed recipients than to relatively badly governed recipients during the 25 With respect to the group of lower income recipients the Netherlands is even the only country that became more selective in granting aid. 26 This also applies to France. Greater selectivity of French aid to higher income recipients is in striking contrast to the above noted decline in the between component of French aid. 27 For details on how we classify recipient countries see the data section above; for a list of countries belonging to the two subgroups see Appendix Table A1 . 28 The overall Theil indices shown at the top of Table 3 are the same as in Tables 1 and 2 Turning to selectivity, the above finding that few sample countries did not receive any aid from bilateral or multilateral sources applies to recipients with relatively good governance as well as recipients with relatively bad governance. 29 More surprisingly, the extensive margin of concentration declined further after the Paris Declaration for the subgroup of relatively badly governed recipients.
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In contrast, the extensive margin of bilateral aid concentration increased (from 0.022 to 0.086) for the subgroup of relatively well governed recipients. 31 One could have expected the opposite pattern if donors had strengthened the merit-based allocation of aid.
The unexpected decrease in the extensive margin of the Theil index for the subgroup of relatively badly governed recipients can be observed in Table 3 In the second step of assessing the merit-based aid allocation, we replicate the previous analysis after separating the two income groups of recipient countries as defined above. In other words, we assess whether merit plays a more important role in the allocation of aid to either lower income countries or higher income countries. Again, the dividing line between relatively well and relatively badly governed countries is drawn such that all subgroups are of (almost) equal size.
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As can be seen in Table 4 , the overall Theil indices point to more concentrated aid for the subgroup of higher income recipient countries than for the subgroup of lower income recipient countries. This holds for all donor groups and all individual DAC donors, both before and after the Paris Declaration. Furthermore, the between component of the Theil index is typically higher for the subgroup of higher income recipient countries than for the subgroup of lower income recipient countries. 33 Importantly, this does not imply that donors favored better governed recipients over worse governed recipients mainly within the higher income group. To the contrary, worse governed recipients in the higher income group received much higher aid shares than better governed recipients in this group (see also below). 34 .
32 For a list of countries belonging to the four different subgroups thus obtained, see Appendix Table A2 . 33 Again, this holds for the first as well as second sub-period with few exceptions (Japan, the United Kingdom and Denmark in the first sub-period). 34 In the lower income group, by contrast, it is the group of better governed recipients that receive larger (but declining) aid shares from donor groups as well as from most individual DAC donors.
With the exception of aid from multilateral donors to the higher income group of recipients, the overall Theil indices of donor groups declined in the second sub-period. However, there is a striking difference between the two income groups of recipients with respect to the change over time in the between component of the Theil index: The between component declined for aid from all donor groups to lower income recipients, whereas the between component increased for aid from donor groups to higher income recipients. The former observation means that the earlier focus on lower income recipients with relatively good governance weakened considerably, particularly for aid from the group of bilateral DAC donors. The latter observation means that the earlier focus on higher income recipients with relatively poor governance became even slightly stronger.
The above finding that the Paris Declaration did not help improve the merit-based allocation of aid is also corroborated when assessing the selectivity of donor groups within refined subgroups of recipients based on income and governance. In particular, Table 4 shows that donor groups had not become more selective in granting aid to lower income recipients with relatively poor governance in the second sub-period -and at best only marginally so in granting aid to the group of higher income recipients with relatively poor governance.
Likewise, the evidence on individual DAC donors in Table 4 underscores previous results. The increasingly weak merit-based allocation of bilateral aid from DAC donors holds particularly for the lower income group of recipients. For all nine DAC donors, the between component of the Theil indices and the aid shares of recipients with relatively good governance within the lower income group declined in the second sub-period. 35 Moreover, most of the DAC donors did not become more 35 At the same time, within the higher income group recipients with relatively good governance received increased aid shares in the second sub-period only from France, the United States and Norway (and marginally for Germany).
selective in granting aid to lower income recipients with relatively poor governance. 36 The picture is more ambiguous with regard to the extensive margin of the concentration of aid from individual DAC donors to higher income recipients, notably the better governed countries among them. With respect to the recipients with relatively poor governance within the higher income group only France and the Netherlands (and marginally Germany) became slightly more selective after the Paris declaration.
Trade-related self-interest still matters
In order to assess whether foreign aid became less concentrated on relatively important trading partners, we follow the same procedure as in the previous sections and classify all sample countries into two about equally sized subgroups. More precisely, we classify recipient countries as relatively important (unimportant) export markets if they rank above (below) the median in terms of their average share in the donor's total exports throughout the period of observation. 37 In line with the relevant literature, we assume that the concentration of aid on relatively important export markets should have become weaker if donors were less self-interested in promoting their own exports through aid after the Paris Declaration.
Not surprisingly, the calculations of the between components of the Theil indices for the donor groups in Table 5 indicate that trade-related self-interest played a larger role for bilateral DAC aid than for multilateral aid. In 1995-2004, more important trading partners received 73.6% of bilateral DAC aid, compared to 59.5% of multilateral aid. At the same time, the group of DAC donors allocated just 26.4%
of overall aid to less important trading partners, whereas multilateral donors allocated 40.5% of their aid to this group of recipients. More strikingly perhaps, these differences between the two donor 36 The Netherlands and, to a minor extent, Norway provide the only exceptions. The extensive margin of the concentration of aid from DAC donors (again with the exception of the Netherlands) did not increase either for the subgroup of lower income recipients with relatively good governance. 37 For details see the data section above. For a list of countries belonging to the two subgroups see Appendix Table A1 .
groups narrowed somewhat after the Paris Declaration. The decline in the between component of the Theil index for bilateral aid suggests a slightly weaker motivation of DAC donors of using bilateral aid as a means of export promotion. Conversely, the (modest) increase in the between component for multilateral aid suggests that the trade-related interests of major shareholders induced a shift toward more important export markets among the recipients of multilateral aid. 
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In Table 6 , we consider the importance of export markets within the subgroups of recipient countries with relatively low and, respectively, relatively high per-capita income. 39 This refinement reveals that the earlier finding of a decline in the between component of the Theil index for bilateral aid is restricted to the higher income group of recipients. In contrast, bilateral as well as multilateral aid has increasingly been concentrated on more important export markets among lower income recipients. Likewise, it speaks against a less self-interested aid allocation that there are few indications of greater selectivity of donor groups, in particular with respect to more important trading partners.
While all three donor groups became slightly more selective among the less important trading partners of the low income group, the only example of greater selectivity among the more important trading partners is that of the multilateral donors among the higher income recipients.
Among major DAC donors, French aid was persistently and extremely highly concentrated on more important export markets in both income groups of recipients. 40 For Germany, the between component of the Theil index was slightly lower in 1995-2004 than that of France but further increased for both income groups, revealing a stronger concentration on more important exports markets after the Paris Declaration. The above noted decline in the between component for the United States is limited to the higher income group of recipients. As concerns the smaller DAC donors, the between 38 Comparing the change in the extensive margins of aid concentration between individual DAC donors hardly offers additional insights. Most DAC donors became less selective in granting aid to both subgroups of recipients in Table 5 . France and the Netherlands provide notable exceptions insofar as selectivity increased for both subgroups of recipients. 39 For a list of countries belonging to the resulting four subgroups (for the case of the donor groups) see Appendix Table A2 . 40 In both income groups the share of aid allocated to the more important trading partners exceeded 90%. The concentration of Japanese aid on more important export markets among lower income recipients was even stronger. However, the concentration of Japanese aid on more important export markets among higher income recipients weakened somewhat in the second sub-period, decreasing from 90 to 85.7%.
component mostly increased in the second sub-period. 41 The corresponding shifts of aid toward more important export markets also speak against less self-interested DAC donors after the Paris Declaration.
Finally, the extensive margins of the concentration of aid from the nine DAC donors in our sample provide another piece of evidence against a weaker export motivation of bilateral aid after the Paris Declaration. The number of aid recipients increased for 26 subgroups of recipients, while the number of aid recipients decreased in just ten subgroups. 42 What is more, reductions in the extensive margin of the concentration of aid from individual DAC donors outnumber increases in the extensive margin independently of whether one considers more or less important export markets in the lower income group or in the higher income group of recipients. Apart from the Netherlands which became substantially more selective in all four country groups, France is the only individual donor that became (slightly) more selective in at least three country groups (the exception being the more important export markets in the lower income group). 
Summary
By making use of aid flows up to 2015, we re-consider the question of whether bilateral and multilateral donors have targeted aid increasingly to particularly needy recipient countries with relatively good governance in order to improve the effectiveness of aid. Specifically, we assess whether aid has become more concentrated on poor and meritorious recipients after the Paris Declaration on 41 Danish aid to the higher income group and Swedish aid to the lower income group provide exceptions. 42 Table 6 lists four subgroups of recipients for each of the nine DAC donors: lower income recipients with either more or less importance for exports and higher income recipients with either more or less importance for exports. 43 The only other cases of greater selectivity are Norway for both subgroups of the higher income countries and Denmark for the more important trading partners in the higher income group. Third, the Paris Declaration did not help improve the merit-based allocation of aid. The between components of Theil indices rather point to an increasing concentration of bilateral aid on relatively poorly governed recipient countries. Almost all DAC donors refrained from re-allocating aid to achieve a more merit-based allocation. Moreover, the extensive margin of the concentration of (bilateral and multilateral) aid declined after the Paris Declaration for the group of relatively poorly governed recipients. All these findings are corroborated when re-assessing the role of governance for the allocation of aid within distinct income groups of recipient countries. In particular, the focus of bilateral aid on lower income recipients with relatively good governance weakened considerably.
Finally, we do not find compelling evidence suggesting that the importance of donor exports as a determinant of aid allocation has declined since 2005. This is even though the decline in the between component of the Theil index for the group of DAC donors suggests a slightly weaker motivation of using bilateral aid as a means of export promotion. In contrast, the trade interests of major shareholders seem to have induced a shift of multilateral aid toward more important exports markets.
Moreover, changes in the between component of the Theil index differed considerably between DAC donors. The surprising observation that especially the United States favored important trading partners less strongly after 2005 applies only to the higher income group of recipients. It also speaks against a less self-interested aid allocation that there are few indications of greater selectivity, particularly among the more important trading partners.
All in all, the Paris Declaration does not appear to have changed donor behavior systematically and consistently. The gap between donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation persists, even though some DAC donors shifted aid to needier recipient countries. Commitments to reward better governed recipients and not to misuse aid as an export-promotion tool appear to be particularly hard to enforce.
Moreover, selectivity remains an issue in order to avoid duplication and proliferation of aid efforts. Note: period averages.
Source: OECD-DAC, Creditor Reporting System Note: period averages.
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